Abstract-Charity foundation internal governance as a hot topic in both theory and practice are concerned. However little literature has discussed the relationship between the character of Board of Director, Supervisors and agency costs. This research studies 213 charity foundations during the period from 2011 to 2012, and tries to investigate and answer the following two questions: firstly, the impact of charity foundations' Board of director and Supervisors on agency costs. Secondly, whether charity foundations' internal governance can effectively reduce agency costs. Our conclusions include: Firstly, the bigger size of the foundation Board of Director , the more beneficial to reduce agency costs .Secondly, it's not conducive to reducing agency costs when the board of director often holds meetings and when chairman and general secretary share the dual identity. Thirdly, charity foundations' Board of Supervisors had no significant effect on reducing agency costs. The current empirical discovery helps to explain the relationship between charity foundations' board of director and board of supervisor and agency cost. The conclusions provide empirical research evidence to support some policies of supervising charity foundations' internal governance to be built.
I. INTRODUCTION
Agency issues are not only widespread in modern companies, but are also prevalent in modern charity foundations. Charity Foundations, as typical non-profit organizations, have the characteristics as follows: first, non-profit. Charity foundations are usually not profitable, even if the charity foundations gain profits in the course of the operation, the profits are not allocated to the property owner, but continue to serve as the financial resources of philanthropy activities. Second, the particularity of the goal. Unlike the goals of survival, development and profitability of for-profit organizations like enterprises, the goal of charity foundations is to use their own and social resources to help groups that need help and promote social progress, the social value of theirs is far greater than the economic value. Thus, for the property owners who create charity foundations, the purpose of creating the charity foundations is to maximize the social value of theirs. However, apart from the property owners (or founders), the charity foundations are also related to a number of other stakeholders, including internal councils, secretary-generals, board of supervisors, staff; external donors, donation recipients, regulators such as government, the media and the public, etc. According to the theory of corporate governance, in enterprises that the ownership and management right are separated, the difference between the principal and the agent's goal leads to the opportunistic behavior of the agents, to violate the interests of the client for the benefit of themselves. This will result in the decrease of the value of the company [11] . A lot of empirical evidence suggests that the agency costs between managers and shareholders significantly affect corporate finance decisions, investment decisions and corporate value. Are there also agency issues, arising from inconsistencies in the interests of property owners and managers, in such non-profit organizations as charity foundations? What is the relationship between the board of supervisors and the agency costs? These are the focuses of this paper.
A Theories and Hypothesis
Over the past two decades, the researchers have formed a corporate governance theoretical research system through unremitting efforts. The study of corporate governance focused on the relationship among corporate performance, the role of the board and the characteristics of state governance.
According to the results of domestic and international researches, the traditional, general corporate governance mechanism, to some extent, can be applied to the study of non-profit organizations' governance structure. However, as for charity foundation, which is a typical type of non-profit organization, the study of its internal governance structure cannot be fully in accordance with that of the profit-oriented organizations'.
Combined with the characteristics of the current Chinese charity foundations, this paper has mainly made the following assumptions:
H1: The larger the board of directors of charitable foundations, the more conductive it is to reducing agency costs.
H2: The more meetings held by the board of directors of charity foundations each year, the less conductive it is to reducing agency costs. H3: When charity foundations' chairman and secretary is the same person, it is not conducive to the reduction of agency costs.
H4: The longer the term of office of the secretary-general of charity foundations, the higher the agency costs are.
H5: The greater the scale of the board of supervisors of charity foundations, the more conducive it is to reducing agency costs.
H6: The more meetings the charity foundations' board of supervisors hold, the more conducive it is to reducing agency costs.
B Model Design
In order to test the assumptions above, the following regression model (1), model (2) and model (3) are established. The definition and description of the variables of the models are shown in Table 1 .
The detailed definitions of the relevant variables are shown in Table 1 
Ponp

Control variables
The nature of the charity foundation National foundations are coded as 1; local foundations are coded as 0
Size
The size of the charity organization Ln(the year end number of reported annual assets)
C Descriptive Statistics
According to Table 2 , the mean and the standard deviation of AOR are 0.41 and 0.52 respectively, which means the rate of asset of charitable foundations differs a lot in China. The maximum and minimum of AER are 0 and 0.22 respectively, and the mean and the standard 
III. CONCLUSIONS
This paper through empirical research analyzes the relationships between board of director and board of supervisory and agency cost. We find that:
The larger size of board of director is, the more advantageous to reduce agency costs of charitable foundations. The more numbers of times which the board of director holds a conference, the more disadvantageous to reduce agency costs. The fact that the board director is the same as the secretary general is disadvantageous to reduce agency costs. If the board director is the same as the secretary general, it is more disadvantageous to reduce agency costs and to improve administrative efficiency.
Because charitable foundations are typically non-profit organizations, the higher cash flow means that the management has better ability to raise money. And the better ability to raise money would bring more stakeholders, which is advantageous to improve external supervision from stakeholders to managers of charitable foundations and then reduce agency costs.
In conclusion, this paper empirically analyses the relationships between the board of director, the board of supervisory and agency cost, and draw the following conclusions by taking models and regression analysis: the larger size of board of director is, the more advantageous to reduce agency costs of charitable foundations; the more numbers of times which the board of director holds a conference, the more disadvantageous to reduce agency costs; the board director is the same as the secretary general which is disadvantageous to reduce agency costs. However, this paper still has some limitations. For example, H4, H5 and H6 do not get confirmed by regression analysis, which means that in this paper we do not find the relationships between internal government structure, especially the term of secretary general, the size of the board of supervisory and the numbers of times which the board of supervisory holds a conference, and agency cost of charitable foundations. The direction of continuing research in the future would be building and analyzing structural equation model between internal government structure and agency cost, which uses agency cost as internal variable and above-mentioned variables as external variables.
